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Chapter 6
THE 1976 SOWETO UPRISING
Like the rehearsal for revolution that shook Russia in 1905, the Soweto uprising
took both rulers and ruled by surprise and, by the time its course was run, left both
sides with as many unresolved political dilemmas as before. The uprising deepened
existing disagreements in the National Party over how best to defend and legitimize
Afrikaner rule, and ultimately set the party on an uncertain course of reform which led
to its eventual fall from power two decades later. Blacks were forced by the uprising to
confront their failure to find a strategy for liberation, but they emerged from the
confrontations of 1976-77 with a much stronger sense of the vulnerability of white
power, and a far deeper appreciation of the need for thorough political organization. The
revolt raised the awareness of millions of young South Africans who thereafter dated
their political coming of age in relation to its events. To an unprecedented degree, South
Africa's Coloured minority made common cause with the African majority in
demonstrating its rejection of the apartheid system. For older generations of Africans,
1976 marked the transition from a period of conservative political culture in which the
young played a distinctly subordinate role, to a new era of struggle energized by the
participation and leadership of thousands of youthful activists for whom the student
uprising had been a political baptism by fire.
The Emergence of Youth Politics
Almost as soon as university students in SASO began reinventing the ideology of
black nationalism in 1970-71, the tough language and idealistic principles of SASO's new
credo began to attract attention among African high school students.1 SASO cultivated this
attention, and resolved at its 1972 annual conference to build links with school age youth
and to extend SASO's leadership training methods to include them.2 When the Tiro
incident resulted in mass walk-outs by black university students in mid-1972, dozens of
SASO activists found work as teachers in understaffed secondary schools, carrying the
contagion of black consciousness out of one set of classrooms and into another.
The defiant mood of black consciousness and its emphasis on the assertion of a
positive black identity appealed strongly to many young Africans growing up in a time of
unsettling cultural changes and dissonance in intergenerational relationships. In and
around Johannesburg, where The World and the Rand Daily Mail carried news on the
university crisis and on statements made by black consciousness figures, high school
students became avid consumers of press reports on their new idols. The East London
Daily Dispatch came to fulfill a similar informational function for students in the eastern
Cape after Biko's restriction to King William's Town in March 1973 and his subsequent
friendship with the liberal editor of the Dispatch, Donald Woods. The growing popularity
of Afro dress, and of music, poetry, and township theater with a black consciousness
message, further broadened SASO's appeal until "thinking black" had assumed the
proportions of an "in" thing among literate young Africans in the townships of the Reef
and the eastern Cape. "We say it with all honesty," declared one student in a newsletter of
the high school-based South African Students Movement(SASM) in 1973. "We idolize
Black consciousness. It is our only defence against a . . . system that corrodes ones spirit"
(Document 1). A poem in the same newsletter hailed SASO's Bokwe Mafuna as a "deity
of Africa" because of his defiant attitude in court when charged with a violation of his
banning order.
SASO's aim in reaching out to a youth constituency was to lay the broadest possible
foundation for future political organization. Emotional slogans and poems might capture
the imagination of teenagers, but more important was the training of a cadre of committed
and astute activists who, when the time was right, could guide future political action.
High school students who might eventually be university students formed one pool of
potential recruits; young school leavers, employed or unemployed, formed another. We
saw in Chapter 5 how the creation of Black Community Programmes enabled Biko to take
up full time employment as BCP's "youth coordinator" in mid-1972. Criss-crossing the
country to meet with church and YMCA groups, youth clubs, student societies, and
informal township social gatherings, Biko, Harry Nengwekhulu, Bennie Khoapa, Tebogo
Mafole and other movement organizers pushed for the formation of regional youth
federations which could draw existing groups together into larger umbrella bodies geared
principally to school leavers.
In August 1972, the Natal Youth Organisation was launched at Edendale Lay
Ecumenical Centre near Pietermaritzburg, followed in a matter of months by the
formation of the Transvaal Youth Organisation (TRAYO), the eastern Cape Border Youth
Union, and the Western Cape Youth Organisation. In early June 1973, in what SASO's
annual conference report called "the culmination of a dream," representatives of these
bodies met for four days at the Mount Coke Hotel near King William's Town and launched
the National Youth Organisation (NAYO). The conference report from Mount Coke
(Document 2) shows the strong guiding influence of SASO's ideology and personnel as
well as its programmatic focus on spreading political awareness through cultural
activities, literacy projects, and propaganda against homeland and system collaborators.
By the time NAYO moved onto the political stage, however, this repertoire of low-
risk tactics was steadily losing appeal. The authorities were issuing bans and
restrictions to high profile black consciousness leaders, and stepping up efforts to
intimidate outspoken activists by rounding them up for questioning (and gratuitous
beatings) at local police stations. The presence of informers was increasingly feared.
Blacks who were suspected of spying at meetings faced being "workshopped" - roughed
up until they confessed. One result of the ever harsher political climate was that NAYO
and its constituent bodies tended to attract only those who were already highly politicized.
One TRAYO leader testified in a 1976 trial that TRAYO at its height had only about a
hundred members.3 Most people who were bold enough to attend meetings and leadership
seminars of groups like NAYO and TRAYO already considered themselves "conscientized,"
and had moved on to thinking about "phase two," the physical liberation that was to follow
the stage of psychological preparation.
Preoccupation with "phase two" dimmed the enthusiasm of youthful recruits for
the patient tactics designed a few years earlier to spread the philosophy of black
consciousness. Planning for armed revolt now seemed much more urgent, especially
after Mozambique's independence in June 1975 opened up new prospects for guerrilla
infiltration across South Africa's northeastern border. Within a year of NAYO's founding,
many of its members were trying to organize secret cells and make contact with the older
liberation movements in the hope of integrating themselves into what they imagined
might be well-advanced underground plans for armed struggle. Some had left for exile or
made forays to neighboring states to try to establish contact with the ANC or PAC, or with
the Botswana-based representatives of the black consciousness movement. Other
activists in the meantime were cultivating friendships with veterans of the older
liberation movements, including ex-Robben Island prisoners, who in some cases were
able by 1975 to facilitate links with the nascent and rudimentary ANC and PAC
undergrounds.
A small number of participants in black consciousness youth organizations came
from families with a background of involvement in the ANC, PAC, or the Unity Movement,
but most had no knowledge of the older organizations and were eager to learn about them.
In May 1974, a joint NAYO-TRAYO leadership seminar at Wilgespruit conference center
in Roodepoort featured a speech by Zephania Mothopeng, a former national executive
member of the banned PAC who at that moment was temporarily not under restriction
orders. Using a PAC slogan that was later to reappear in the rhetoric of youth
organizations, Mothopeng exhorted his audience to be prepared to "serve, suffer, and
sacrifice" for the sake of Africa's future. But despite the close affinity between the
ideology of black consciousness and the PAC's variant of blacks-only nationalism, it was
the nonracial ANC with its longer historical tradition and better organized networks that
from 1975 onwards achieved the greatest success in attracting young new adherents.
NAYO in particular provided a fertile field for ANC recruitment. Between June
and October 1975, police swooped on dozens of young people suspected of subversive
activities under cover of NAYO and its affiliates, and seven of those arrested were tried
for terrorism in what became known as the "NAYO trial" beginning in late 1975. The
trial was frought with ominous signs of the militant mood building up among the younger
generation of Africans. It showed that although very few young people were prepared to
undertake high-risk political action, the number of such people was appreciably
growing. Events in Mozambique had imbued blacks with optimism and the white security
forces with new ruthlessness. Brutal police interrogation methods were becoming a fact
of life. This reality is addressed in Document 3, "The System and You,' an article that
appeared in early 1976 in the SASO Newsletter. Document 4, an affidavit by a young
woman detained as a potential witness in the NAYO trial, describes police methods in grim
detail. Police succeeded in forcing some of those detained to sign false statements
incriminating others; later, some detainees courageously recanted these statements in the
witness box. At the NAYO trial the atmosphere among spectators became so charged that
on March 18, 1976, a violent confrontation erupted between police and the large crowd
gathered in the street outside the court building. Document 5, an eye-witness account
of this incident by an unidentified friend of the defendants, offers striking evidence of the
taut emotions ready to burst forth from beneath Johannesburg's surface calm.
In reaching for the generation immediately junior to themselves, SASO's
strategists particularly targetted senior secondary school students as the segment of
black society in which future political leadership had to be nurtured. Drop-out rates at
every stage of South Africa's school system were high, with the result that Africans
enrolled in the last two years of secondary school in the early 1970s comprised less than
two percent of their age cohort.4 These students, though predominantly working class in
origin, formed an incipient intellectual and economic elite by virtue of their education.
As potential university students, they were both SASO's constituency-to-be and the social
group ultimately put most at risk politically by the state's long-term cooptive strategies.
The physical concentration* of high school students in institutional settings made them
relatively easy to reach compared to working or unemployed youths, and their level of
literacy made them recruitable through the written word as well as by verbal
persuasion. The only barriers to their rapid conscientization were the fears induced by
parents, and the hostility of most government-employed teachers and school principals to
anything exuding even the faintest whiff of politics. But even in boarding school settings,
school authorities were incapable of insulating their institutions against all black
consciousness influences. Contacts with older siblings, the circulation of black
consciousness publications, and the popularity of younger teachers infected with the SASO
"virus," all ensured the fairly speedy dissemination of the new nationalism among
secondary students. The bolder students in turn undertook to radicalize their more timid
teachers, as Document 1 attests.
Within two years of SASO's birth, secondary students had begun here and there to
form small political clubs, often at the instigation of a teacher who was a closet radical.
Organizing themselves as debating societies or community service clubs, these
associations came and went as the friendship groups on which they were based formed or
dissolved, or as school authorities interfered to restrain their activities. The principal
of Inanda Girls Seminary near Durban shut down a political club which formed there in
1971, and in Cape Town a Coloured students' group called SABSA -- the South African
Black Scholars' Association -- folded under pressure of police threats in 1973 after
about two years of activity.5 The most important of these high school groups was the
Soweto-based African Students' Movement (ASM), which in January 1972 changed its
name to the South African Students' Movement (SASM) as part of an ambitious plan,
instigated by SASO, to convert itself into a national organization.
ASM was originally formed in 1969 by a weekend study group of Soweto students
preparing for matriculation exams with the assistance of Tom Manthata, a young teacher
at Sekano Ntoane High School who was also involved in the organization of church-based
youth clubs. Manthata was a Catholic seminary drop-out who was disaffected with the
church but drawn to the unconventional theology of the University Christian Movement in
which his cousin, Justice Moloto, was a leading activist. Through Moloto and the UCM,
Manthata became a friend of SASO's leaders and an adherent of its emerging philosophy.6
ASM took shape around a handful of school debating societies that were nurtured by
Manthata and several like-minded Soweto teachers, sometimes using the occasion of
sports tournaments to arrange interschool debates on topics likely to stimulate political
discussion. In July 1971 the organization made its first tentative foray into the public
consciousness by staging a noisy demonstration to protest the excessive amount of time
students were required to spend practising for choir competitions at the expense of their
studies. The day after placard-waving ASM members had disrupted a national choir
competition with 4,000 participants at Springs, the tabloid headlines of The World
warned that children were "running wild."7 ASM's message on this occasion was
ostensibly nonpolitical, but the protest was an effort by the organization to put itself
forward as a voice for student complaints. Peter Lenkoe, a student at Madibane High
School and the president of ASM, reported to a SASO national executive committee meeting
in Pietermaritzburg five months later that the organization was attracting between 700
and 800 participants to its meetings, though not ail were dues-paying.8
When ASM reorganized itself as SASM in January 1972 it aimed to build a
national movement of high school students, but found the task more formidable than
anticipated. After about a year, branches were functioning at nine Johannesburg schools
and a roughly equivalent number of schools scattered throughout the rest of the country,
but progress was slow. Branches would be launched only to fall dormant within a
semester or two. Travelling beyond the area of the Reef required money and mobility that
SASM organizers in Johannesburg did not have. Getting access to a typewriter or
telephone usually required that a Soweto student travel to the city center where such
equipment could be borrowed at the offices of the Christian Institute, the BPC, or REESO,
SASO's Reef headquarters. Most students shied away from open participation in SASM
meetings. Talk that was openly political provoked such stern reprimands from school
authorities and parents that many students were fearful.9 Bringing in outside speakers
to give lectures to school clubs was one relatively safe activity; university students
prominent in SASO found themselves frequently invited to address highschool debating
societies. Cultural activities like concerts and plays were another way for SASM to draw
an audience. The most interested students would then be invited to participate in weekend
seminars at Wilgespruit or St. Ansgar's, church centers in Roodepoort which made their
facilities available for student meetings. Here again it would be the leaders of SASO who
usually made the principal input, organizing focussed political discussions, simulation
exercises, and workshops on techniques of organization, from how to raise funds, keep
minutes, and run a meeting, to how to teach adult literacy using Paulo Freire's method of
"conscientization" (See Chapter 4).
SASM, like NAYO, was set back by the March 1973 banning of SASO's top
leadership, followed by the banning in September of Mathe Diseko, who was both
president of NAYO and national secretary of SASM. SASM in Johannesburg went into
eclipse for the better part of a year until a new leadership could be assembled in mid-
1974 with the encouragement of SASO and the BPC. In the meantime, Biko and his coterie
of lieutenants in King William's Town's Ginsberg location had stimulated the formation of
SASM branches in several nearby high schools in the eastern Cape.
The rejuvenated SASM, coming on the scene after the Lisbon coup of April 1974,
was increasingly driven by the new fever of interest in armed struggle. The ANC's Radio
Freedom was now broadcasting regularly into South Africa on shortwave, and ANC leaflets
and literature were circulating more widely than earlier. Some students drawn to SASM
were determined to become guerrilla fighters and sought to leave South Africa by
hazardous routes; some succeeded, some were caught, and more than a few turned back
when discretion became the better part of valor. Document 6, a letter describing one
student's escape route to Botswana, was presented as evidence for the prosecution in the
trial of five SASM members from Healdtown high school in the eastern Cape who were
caught while making departure plans in 1975.10 Bullets, wrote another Healdtown
student with bravado, were "the only language that Vorster and his dogs understand.
South Africa will be Africa's Vietnam."11
Intense debate and disagreement increasingly affected the once unreserved
admiration of younger for older black consciousness activists as some who wanted to join
the exile armies took issue with others, usually older, who argued that guerrilla warfare
would be fruitless until a stronger political foundation for revolution had been laid inside
South Africa. At a conference for SASM leaders run by SASO and the staff of Black
Community Programmes in King William's Town over Easter weekend in 1975, the
emphasis was on building SASM as a body that would politicize high school students and
make them agents for the organized radicalization of adult society in the future.
Document 7, a paper prepared for the conference by Malusi Mpumlwana of the BCP,
outlines behavioral do's and don't's appropriate for a growing cadre of political agitators
working circumspectly "within the law but outside the system." It was still official
policy in the senior black consciousness organizations to shun any identification with the
illegal exile movements, even if individual members chose to associate with them
privately, and even though Biko through his lieutenants was engaged in protracted secret
talks with representatives of the ANC and PAC undergrounds in the hope of effecting a
united front (See Chapter 5).
In SASM, would-be fighters outnumbered talkers, and counsels of caution from
older activists often provoked resentment. "When we asked questions concerning the
future programs of the people," Daniel Montsitsi, a militant SASM leader at Sekano
Ntoane high school in Soweto, later recalled,
we were told "We have to conscientise the black masses, as this will ensure
understanding and support for us, then we shall be able to bargain from a
position of strength." Unfortunately we were not in the mood to bargain or
negotiate; we were impatient and militant, and rebellious of the black
consciousness leadership. With puffed lips and closed eyes straight from
[being beaten up by the police] . . . we did not feel like talking; we wanted to
fight but did not know how. We made jokes about the leadership when our
spirit was high, that they encourage us to conscientize the masses, until they
reach a stage where they'll explode on their own.12
While abstract debates about the alternative merits of guerrilla warfare and mass
insurrection continued unresolved, SASM through SASO received two donations from the
International Universities Exchange Fund in Europe, one in late 1975 and the other in
May 1976, totalling about $7000. This made it possible to finance travel expenses and
to employ a full-time SASM organizer, Zweli Sizani. Participation picked up in Soweto,
and in early 1976 branches were in existence or in the process of forming in schools in
Mamelodi, Mabopane and Atteridgeville in Pretoria, as well as in KwaThema (Springs),
Kagiso (Krugersdorp), Tembisa (Kempton Park), Thaba Nchu in the Orange Free State,
Kwa Mashu in Durban, and Athlone High School in Cape Town.13 On the last weekend of
May, the organization held a three day conference in Roodepoort where a range of topics
related to student and national life was debated (Document 8). Three senior black
consciousness figures addressed the meeting, along with SASM's outgoing president, Vusi
Tshabalala, who called on his audience to brace for further harassment from the state. A
new executive was elected, while Sizani continued as full-time organizing secretary.
Although it may be an overstatement to claim, as Brooks and Brickhill do in their very
valuable history of the Soweto uprising, that by June 1976 "SASM was fully fledged as a
national school student movement . . [with] a well-organized structure, [and] a vigorous
program of activities,"14 it was certainly true that the organization had survived
through ups and downs and had established a measure of autonomy from adult influence.
Some of its activists had acquired substantial organizing experience, and had a vision of
SASM as a vehicle for the national mobilization of students, although even as late as May
1976 no one anticipated how such a mobilization might be triggered or what its outcome
might be.
"This Burden is Heavy. . ."
According to the minutes of SASM's May 1976 conference, the first subject
debated was the government's highly unpopular imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of
instruction in African schools on a 50-50 basis alongside English. Dual-medium
instruction had officially been prescribed since the mid-1950s, but educationists had
been publicly critical of the policy, and their objections, plus a dearth of African
teachers proficient in Afrikaans, had resulted in most African schools being granted
annual exemptions from the formal requirement up through 1974. In that year
government policy shifted as part of a political effort by Vorster and National Party
pragmatists to appease partyverkramptes (ultra-conservatives) who were unhappy
about what they saw as party moves toward "liberalization," including the acceptance of
racially mixed sports and the government's long delayed decision to introduce television
in South Africa -- a step that conservatives feared would strengthen the dominant
position of English over Afrikaans in popular culture.15 Hence it was announced by the
Bantu Education department that from 1975, African schools in the southern Transvaal
region would be required to phase in Afrikaans-medium instruction in mathematics and
social studies starting in Standard 5 (the seventh grade). There were strong objections
raised by African teachers and community school boards, but department officials were
unbending. Students affected by the new policy showed poor exam results at the end of
1975. Fears of failure joined with political distaste for "the language of the oppressor"
to fan student discontent as the next school year began.16 Adding insult to injury just
prior to the opening of the 1976 academic year, Vorster announced in January that Dr.
Andries Treurnicht, the hard-line leader of Xheverkramptes, would become the new
deputy minister of Bantu Education.
Top to bottom, South Africa's school system under National Party rule was a
showcase for institutionalized racial discrimination. African schools ranked lowest in
state expenditure per pupil, numbers of professionally trained teachers, and the quality
of school facilities; they ranked highest in pupil-teacher ratios and drop-out rates.
Schools for Indians and Coloureds fared somewhat better, while the system for whites
consumed public resources out of all proportion to the number of students served.17
These inequalities in no way reflected the level of demand for education in the respective
racial communities. Educational achievement was one of the few paths out of poverty for
Africans, and working class parents often struggled over many years to meet the costs of
the books, uniforms, and fees necessary to keep their children in school.18 During the
early 1970s, this thirst for education was assuaged to some extent by a rapid expansion
in the number of secondary and university level places for Africans, effected by the state
in response to strong demands from industry and commerce that something be done about
the country's severe skills shortage. Between 1970 and 1975, the number of Africans
pupils admitted to Form I, the first year of secondary school, rocketed from 49,504 to
149,251.19 One result was that many thousands of African teenagers began to reach
levels of schooling far beyond those achieved by their parents, prompting growing
intergenerational friction. At the same time, the unequal and inadequate commitment of
resources to African schools meant that students struggled against deteriorating
conditions in the classroom: double shifts, overcrowding, too few trained teachers,
disappointing pass rates on all-important examinations -- and a continuing perception of
the unclosable gap between their own life chances and the opportunities enjoyed by young
whites.
Township communities might have eased their way through this combustible
mixture of hopes, frustrations, and generational tensions had South Africa's economy
been in a phase of robust expansion.20 But the early 1970s were a period of
retrenchment and slackening growth after South Africa's boom decade of the 1960s. Even
before the country began to feel the effects of world recession and high inflation brought
on by the soaring price of oil in 1973-74, its economy was beset by problems arising
from technological change and the built-in biases of apartheid. Mining and agriculture -
- the original foundations of modern South Africa's growth and of its super-exploitation
of unskilled black labor -- now functioned alongside a large manufacturing sector that
was increasingly constrained by the low productivity of labor and the meager buying
power of African consumers. Persistent efforts by the Vorster government to expand
South Africa's export markets in independent Africa through an aggressive diplomatic
strategy of "detente" were achieving only limited success. The shortage of skilled labor
had been addressed through the expansion of school enrollments, but no sooner had
expansion accelerated than the economic downturn of the mid-1970s resulted in an ever
higher number of school-leavers entering a job market which had all but ceased to grow.
The economic malaise created by rising unemployment and rapid inflation was made
worse by a precipitous decline in the gold price through most of 1975, depriving the
country of the surplus of foreign exchange with which it customarily maintained its level
of imports and eliminated its balance of payments deficit. By late 1975, South Africa was
in a recession of crisis proportions.
Given their monopoly of decision-making in business and government, whites
were in a position to determine whose belts would be tightened the most as economic
conditions worsened. The construction of schools and houses in black urban areas came to
a near standstill, and all efforts were abandoned to keep pace with the needs of expanding
township populations for such services as garbage collection, sewerage, and street
lighting. Parsimony reached new extremes after 1973 when the National Party
government removed African urban areas from the control of adjacent white
municipalities and placed them under twenty-two newly established Bantu Affairs
Administration Boards directly answerable to the Minister of Bantu Administration. The
boards laid off African employees and replaced them with inexperienced whites whose
salaries were paid out of board revenues from rents and township liquor sales, over
which the government maintained a formal monopoly. Subsidies previously paid by white
municipalities to maintain township services were discontinued, and instead a portion of
township rent and beerhall revenues were redistributed to subsidize the administration
of rural homelands.21 In terms of both material living conditions and levels of public
trust, township life was on a steady downward trajectory by the time violence erupted in
June 1976.
Intensified government pressure to impose the grand design of ethnic homelands
further compounded the deteriorating quality of black urban life. Most troubling were
new legal conditions accompanying the independence of the Transkei scheduled to take
place in late 1976, with that of Bophuthatswana to follow soon after. In pursuit of its
dream of creating a South Africa with no African citizens, the Vorster government
stiffened the definition of homeland citizenship originally set out in the Transkei
Constitution Act of 1963, eliminating dual citizenship and the option that urban Africans
might choose to remain South African when "their" homeland attained independence. As
the details of the Transkei's impending independence were increasingly aired in
parliament and discussed across the country, it became evident that as many as 1.3
million urban Xhosa and their descendants were threatened with loss of their South
African citizenship, together with what narrow but precious legal rights to urban
residence this citizenship conferred. As a concession to international and business
pressures for South Africa to accord property rights to permanently urbanized blacks,
renewable 30 year leasehold tenure on township plots had been introduced in 1975,
raising the prospect that children would in future, as a matter of legal right, be able to
inherit houses built, bought, or improved by their parents. Under the new homeland
citizenship provisions, however, the security of this new "right" was nullified.22
Applications for leasehold (like applications for business licenses) were to be accepted
only from those who had taken out homeland citizenship certificates. Moreover, children
born after the independence date of their parents' designated homeland automatically
became citizens of that homeland, forfeiting any legal right to live in "white" South Africa
as adults, or to inherit any fixed property acquired there by their parents.
For people being forced to adjust to new levels of economic insecurity, the added
uncertainty of the new homeland citizenship regulations deepened an already widespread
sense of despair. "Do you want to make us really desperate?" asked Desmond Tutu, the
Anglican Dean of Johannesburg, in a statement carried on the front page of the Rand Daily
8Mail on May 1, 1976. "Desperate people will be compelled to use desperate means" to
achieve redress, he concluded. "I speak with words I hope I have chosen carefully - the
issue of Transkeian citizenship is highly explosive."23 A week later in a personal letter
to Vorster, Tutu again tried to warn that African patience was running out. "A people can
take only so much and no more,0 he wrote (Document 9). "The history of your own
people [the Afrikaners] . . , has demonstrated this, Vietnam has shown this, the struggle
against Portugal has shown this. I am frightened . . . that we may soon reach a point of no
return, when events will generate a momentum of their own, when nothing will stop
their reaching a bloody denouement."24
Tutu's passing reference to the collapse of Portuguese colonialism only hinted at
the powerful emotions of hope and expectation that events in Mozambique and Angola had
kindled among Africans. Not only had black guerrilla armies defeated Portugal, but South
Africa's own invading army had been repulsed in its effort to prevent the Soviet and
Cuban-backed Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) from taking power in
Luanda following Angolan independence in November 1975. "Winds of change" were
blowing right on the country's borders, Gatsha Buthelezi told Sowetans packed into
Jabulani Ampitheatre on March 14, 1976 (Chapter 9, Document ); South Africa had
"burnt her fingers" trying to stop the inevitable. "When we blacks look at Africa, and
southern Africa in particular," Buthelezi declared, "we desire to take our place with our
black brothers in their new world" -- the world of majority rule, not Pretoria's ethnic
pseudo-independence. Equally bold references to the inevitability of majority rule were
noted by West Rand Administration Board police constables sent to monitor a meeting of
the homeland Lebowa Peoples Party held in Soweto on May 16 (Document 10). To all
blacks, and especially to the young, one African student later recalled, the sudden and
unexpected turn of events in Mozambique and Angola transformed the idea of liberation
from something distant and abstract to "something real, something possible."25
When the 1976 school year commenced in January, overcrowding in African
schools reached new levels nationwide. To reduce the number of school years from 13 to
12, the Bantu Education department had decided in 1975 to abolish standard 6 (the eighth
grade) from the following year, enabling students to proceed directly from standard 5
into the five years of secondary school leading to matriculation. Although this change
promised eventually to relieve pressure on classroom space, it meant that in 1976,
pupils finishing both standard 5 and standard 6 proceeded together into the first year of
secondary school, creating an unweildy bulge of numbers that meant yet more crowding
and double shifts, more shortages of textbooks and qualified secondary teachers. In the
southern Transvaal, moreover, protests by teachers and a few African school boards had
failed to roll back the ruling that Afrikaans instruction in half of all subjects be phased
in starting at junior secondary level. The language ruling most immediately affected the
very students caught in the effects of the bulge. For most African parents, mired in the
desperate daily reality of survival, these hardships were just one more burden to be
borne. But for school children in their teens - not yet faced with the full
responsibilities of adulthood, but experienced enough to know how unfairly life's deck
was stacked against them -- the injustices of "gutter education" suddenly seemed
unbearable. White arrogance, suffered for so long by their parents and teachers, seemed
intolerable, as did the very meekness of the adult generation.
The Uprising Begins
Had authorities in the Bantu Education department been willing to bend on the
Afrikaans ruling while the bulge of junior secondary pupils in the Transvaal endured a
few semesters of intense overcrowding, South Africa might have been spared the
cataclysm of violence and confrontation that swept black schools and townships starting
on June 16, 1976. Instead, a demonstration against Afrikaans, planned as a one-day
protest in Soweto, escalated into a nationwide uprising after police shot dead a number of
student demonstrators, touching off a spiral of rioting and reprisal that rapidly spread to
other areas. Fuelled by the anger and determination of a radicalized youth generation, the
uprising confronted whites with an unprecedented challenge to their dominance. Older
blacks likewise experienced a loss of authority as parents, teachers, urban councillors
and even respected senior political notables found themselves deferring to the high school
students whose initiative, courage and energy were the driving force of the revolt.
Events on June 16 resulted from the intersection of student tensions over the
Afrikaans issue with SASM's renewed efforts to build a national following. Through most
of early 1976 the two developments ran parallel in Soweto secondary schools, where
SASM concentrated its efforts on senior students while the language problem directly
affected only students in Forms 1 and 2 (eighth and ninth grades). As mid-year exams
approached, a class boycott over Afrikaans erupted among Form 1 and 2 students at
Orlando West Junior Secondary School, spreading within a few weeks to seven other
schools. Seeing an opportunity to take a leadership role in the aftermath of their May
28-30 conference, several members of SASM's national executive called a meeting at the
Orlando YMCA in Soweto on the afternoon of Sunday, June 13, ostensibly to form a SASM
regional branch. An unexpectedly large number of students turned up, and a regional
executive committee was chosen, headed by Tsietsi Mashinini, a final year student who
was a leader in the SASM branch at Morris Isaacson High School in the Jabavu section of
Soweto. After a heated discussion of the Afrikaans issue, Mashinini won unanimous
approval for a proposal that students stage a mass demonstration on the following
Wednesday. An Action Committee to organize the protest was formed by enlisting two
representatives from each school under a leadership headed by Mashinini and Seth
Mazibuko, a Form 2 student who had led the initial boycott at Orlando West Junior
Secondary School.
By the time police tried to stop a singing column of children marching along
Vilakazi Street toward Orlando stadium about 9 o'clock on the morning of Wednesday,
June 16th, round-the-clock activity by the Action Committee had mobilized thousands of
students to converge from every corner of Soweto, waving placards denouncing
compulsory Afrikaans instruction. Police had made no preparations for the event, and
their scattered early morning attempts to head off some of the large groups of
demonstrators proved ineffective. Confronting the marchers on Vilakazi Street near the
Orlando West school, a contingent of police fired tear gas canisters into the throng, but
failed to dissuade the demonstrators, who responded by throwing stones. Rather than
retreat, the police then shot into the crowd, killing 12 year old Zolile Hector Pieterson
and wounding several other children.26 This ignited the fury of the marchers, who began
to rampage through the township, smashing windows and using petrol to set fire to
schools, WRAB vehicles, municipal beerhalls, and other government buildings. By
evening Soweto was a battle zone as roaming mobs of youths sought more symbols of
apartheid to put to the torch, and police tried to curb the destruction by shooting at
anyone who appeared to be involved in the rioting. Violence continued in Soweto on June
17, and spread to Krugersdorp on the West Rand and to downtown Johannesburg where
police and white thugs broke up a protest march by students from the University of the
Witwatersrand. While the dead piled up at city mortuaries and hospitals strained to treat
the wounded, newspapers around the world ran a photo of two crying teenagers carrying
the limp body of Hector Pieterson. "Soweto" stood poised to join Sharpeville in the
lexicon of the international anti-apartheid movement.27
The uprising eventually affected more than a hundred urban areas of South Africa
and took nearly a year to run its course, passing through a series of stages as student
leaders changed tactics in an effort to sustain the protests, draw in adult participants, and
respond to government repression. The system of Bantu education and the government's
regional Administration Boards remained targets throughout, along with black
collaborators in the Urban Bantu Councils and homeland governments. Starting in August,
a series of experiments with economic pressure was launched in which students tried to
use stay-ways and consumer boycotts to weaken the state through blows directed at white
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business. Looking inward to the weaknesses of their own community, the students
concentrated their reforming zeal on alcohol consumption, a problem afflicting many
families and one for which a share of the blame could be laid on the system of municipal
beerhalls. Pretoria's efforts to regain the initiative after June 16 were never wholly
successful. A decision in early July to drop the Afrikaans requirement did little to
diminish the momentum of the student crusade which by that time had begun to
consolidate broad support because of the rising number of deaths and the government's
callous displays of indifference towards the carnage. By early 1977, unrest deaths stood
officially at 575.28 As the "disturbances" continued month after month, funerals of the
victims became the occasion for new displays of student militancy, provoking yet more
applications of lethal force by the police. Attempts by the state to quell the uprising by
detaining supposed agitators merely caused the cycle of response and counter-response to
escalate. The deaths of several detainees subjected to torture by the security police
further fed the angry flames of revolt.
To be or Not To Be . . .
Who were the young rebels of 1976, and what did they believe would be achieved
by their sometimes suicidal defiance? No systematic survey of participants was made at
the time, but impressionistic evidence supports the view that African and Coloured school
pupils were joined in significant numbers by out-of-school youths, including tsotsis
(juvenile delinquents) who were a perennial element in township society, and who used
the anarchy of the opening days of the revolt in Soweto to loot liquor stores and rob
township residents. Students at day schools were the prime movers, but upheavals also
occurred at rural boarding institutions. University students staged protests at every
black campus, and at the Universities of Zululand and the Western Cape, arsonists
destroyed a number of campus buildings. Participants came from all social classes,
ethnic groups, and ages. Children as young as ten were shot dead for raising a black
power fist at the police, and hundreds of teenagers were held in police cells for extended
periods, some for weeks at a time.29
Student thinking appears to have run the gamut from reformist to revolutionary,
nonviolent to violent, and from naively emotional to tactically calculating. At the outset
of the uprising, the conscious intent was simply to show whites how vehemently young
blacks rejected the apartheid system of education, and also how frustrated they felt with
the poverty and crowded conditions of township life. "If I die, that's one less person
sleeping under the bed," a schoolgirl told a Soweto social worker who tried to persuade
student demonstrators to go home on the morning of June 16.30 During the rioting
observers noted how common it was for groups of students to stop white motorists and
force them to make the black power sign before allowing them to proceed, as if this
fulfilled a deep desire to humble whites and make them show deference to black humanity.
"As black parents," one Soweto resident observed, "we are forced to produce good sons and
daughters who are passive, non-assertive, non-aggressive, good Ja-baas ("yes, boss")
boys. If they are going to get anywhere they must not talk back. You may ask, why so
much violence? One reason [is a] crying need to say Take notice of us - We are
people.1"31 Further nourishing the demand for respect and recognition was a growing
sense of expectation among students that a successful revolution might soon occur in
South Africa. "It happened at Angola - Why not here?" proclaimed a large banner hung in
a classroom at Orlando West Junior Secondary School on June 16. The "revolutionary
preparedness of the black masses" was evident, the radical diarist at the NAYO trial had
concluded a few months earlier; all that was needed was "a powerful vanguard" prepared
to "take up arms" (Document 5).
But in the absence of weapons that could be taken up, what were Soweto's would-
be revolutionaries to do? One option was to concede the state's command of superior
instruments of violence, and to try to sustain the insurrection through the use of
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nonviolent tactics. This still left open the question of what targets were to be singled out,
and what strategic aims pursued. Another option was to wait and hope that the exiled
liberation movements were at work organizing to return in force. Such expectations were
encouraged from the early days of the revolt by the appearance of ANC leaflets in major
urban centers urging people to "act,0 "protest" and "hit back" at the Vorster government
(Document 11) JMMI tM lBBSSRns t f ams&^V I fCP While clutching at the straw of
possible external intervention, however, student leaders faced the responsibility of
finding a course of action that could maintain the momentum of the uprising once the
rioting of mid-June had subsided. Student courage during the days of violence had
inspired an awed respect from black adults, but there were also critics who questioned
whether the hundreds of dead and wounded was not too high a price for the meager
achievement of a government climb-down on the Afrikaans issue.
It was not hard for the SASM students who constituted the core of the Soweto Action
Committee to think back to the time before June 16 when the building of a constituency
had been an uphill effort. Suddenly a constituency, even a potential national following,
was standing ready; retreat would have been both ignoble and inconsistent with the
precepts of the black consciousness movement, which had never ceased to impress upon
young people their responsibility to analyze, organize, and act as if the future of the
country was in their own hands. In any case, under the circumstances prevailing in mid-
1976, no group of older decision-makers was available to whom leadership could readily
be passed. SASO and the BPC had been severely weakened by bans and repression, and by
mid-July two of their remaining activists in Johannesburg, Tom Manthata and Ken
Rachidi, had been detained. Nor did students look for guidance to the Black Parents
Association (BPA), a supportive group of Soweto professionals who had formed
themselves into a welfare body to coordinate funeral arrangements and receive donations
for the families of victims in the week following June 16. The BPA was willing to act as a
mouthpiece for student demands, but it was not regarded by students as an ally in
decision-making.32 In the uncharted terrain of confrontation with the state, "black man,
you are on your own" had become "black student, you are on your own."
The reopening of schools in the last week of July was marked by high absenteeism
and outbreaks of arson at schools around the country. During the winter recess in July it
had become evident to the Action Committee that nothing could be organized until a return
to school was effected. Burning schools was no solution. Political awareness was at fever
pitch, but constructive action required the strengthening of communication networks that
could only operate if students were congregating in schools on a daily basis. Moreover,
the committee itself needed to be expanded from its original complement of about a dozen
students into a broader body with lines of contact into every Soweto secondary school, not
just the ones that had been represented at the meeting of June 13. It was the consensus of
the Action Committee that after widening the base of organization, a protest should be
organized around the demand that detained students be released. As a means of drawing in
parents, students would call on all Soweto adults to stay at home for a three-day period to
back up the student demand.
Soweto's Urban Bantu Councillors held a public meeting at Jabulani Ampitheatre
on Sunday morning, August 1, to report on a series of consultations between their
members and government representatives regarding community grievances. There was a
high turnout of students, who jeered the councillors1 appeals for moderation and called
for the release of detainees and a continued assault on Bantu education (Document 12).
That afternoon at a smaller meeting of several hundred parents and students convened by
the BPA at Regina Mundi church, further appeals were made for students to return to
school. Tsietsi Mashinini addressed the meeting, endorsed the call for a return to schools,
and announced that student leaders would meet the following morning at the Morris
Isaacson High School.33 When that meeting in turn convened on August 2, the Action
Committee renamed itself the Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC),
reconfirmed Mashinini as chairman, and arranged that each of Soweto's 40 junior and
senior secondary schools be represented on the SSRC by two students. Murphy Morobe,
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another senior student at Morris Isaacson, became vice-chairman, replacing Seth
Mazibuko who had been detained. It was agreed that a list of demands regarding Bantu
education would be compiled and forwarded to the government through the BPA, and that
on Wednesday, August 4, students would march to John Vorster Square security police
headquarters in downtown Johannesburg to demonstrate for the release of detained
students and other leaders. Parents were to be urged by their children to support student
demands by not going to work between Wednesday and Friday.
Thus was launched a new confrontational phase of the revolt, centered on the stay-
away. Like a black power fist thrust in the faces of white motorists, the 1976 stay-
aways were primarily a demonstration of resolve and a vague threat that there could be
worse to come if black demands were not met. Students imagined at the outset that
prolonged work stoppages would cut into the profits of white business to such an extent
that the economy might be faced with collapse. In due course it became evident that
without strong labor unions, workers involved in stay-aways had no protection against
victimization by employers, and thus worker commitment to political strikes was likely
to be fragile and short-lived. Before pushing their newfound tactic beyond its limits,
however, students in August and September organized three relatively successful stay-
aways in Johannesburg, each of several days duration, plus one lasting two days in Cape
Town, and another of two days in Tembisa (Kempton Park). Each of the stay-aways was
preceded by leafletting, and in some areas, particularly in Soweto during the first stay-
away, by intimidatory actions aimed by students at strike breakers.
Azikhwelwa! ("We don't ride," i.e. we don't travel to work), a slogan from the
1940s and '50s that students had discovered in Edward Roux's banned but popular book
Time Longer Than Rope, was adopted as the stay-away rallying cry.34 Early on August 4,
thousands of students converged on Soweto's train stations and bus stops to prevent
commuters leaving for the city. Eyewitnesses subsequently testified to the government-
appointed Cillie Commission of inquiry that stone-throwing occurred at the stations, and
that workers who managed to slip into the city were accosted by angry bands of students
when they returned to the township that evening. Late on the morning of August 4, the
student march on John Vorster Square, estimated by police at 15,000 strong, was
thwarted by a blockade of police vehicles when it reached New Canada at the northeastern
boundary of Soweto. After being dispersed with teargas, the demonstrators retaliated
with further arson attacks on buildings and vehicles, continuing the mayhem into the next
two days amidst crude police efforts at riot control which left many new victims dead.
The Minister of Police and Justice, James Kruger, vacillating between trying to cool the
violence with conciliation or quell it by brute force, appears briefly to have entertained
the idea of meeting with the BPA at the height of the destruction, but then reverted to
basic National Party instincts by arresting the BPA members instead. By the third week
of August, a surface calm had returned to Soweto, but violence had erupted elsewhere
along the Reef and was spreading to the townships of the eastern and western Cape. In
Johannesburg, Tsietsi Mashinini from hiding issued a blunt press statement condemning
the heavy handed actions of the police (Document 13).
The second Soweto stay-away, called by the SSRC for August 23-25, was marked
by lower levels of intimidation and a stronger public response than the one three weeks
earlier. White shops, offices and industries reported 70-80% absenteeism by African
workers. In a startling development on the afternoon of the second day, however, the
burgeoning sense of student power was challenged when an enraged mob of Zulu workers
from the huge Mzimhlope hostel in the Meadowlands area of Soweto stormed through
adjacent sections of the township attacking houses and murdering and terrorizing their
residents.35 As families fled from the path of the armed marauders, men in the affected
neighborhoods organized themselves for defense of their homes, and by nightfall and into
the following week street battles took place pitting residents against hostel-dwellers,
reportedly as police looked on or stayed clear of the trouble zones. Strong evidence soon
emerged that this unforeseen backlash was in fact incited by the police after a mysterious
fire the morning of the 24th had damaged three blocks of the hostel.36 It was probably
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These incidents were confined to Coloured and African townships until September 1, when
African students staged a peaceful placard march in downtown Cape Town. On the
following two mornings, police were prepared when more students, this time both
Coloureds and Africans, massed in the city's central business district. Tear-gas and baton
charges dispersed the demonstrators on September 2, but on Friday, September 3, police
fired both tear-gas and bird shot into startled crowds on Adderley Street as hundreds of
fleeing protesters mingled into throngs of lunchtime onlookers. Offices and shops closed
early, and gun shops sold out as panicky whites got their first close-up look at the
uprising. As some units of the riot police quelled protests in the central city, other units
fanned out to try to restore order in the townships. Reporting on one incident whu'h by
this time had become part of a familiar pattern, a correspondent for the Rand Daily Mail
wrote that at about noon on September 3,
the riot squad charged into the Alexander Sinton High School [in the Coloured
township of Athlone] for the second time after cars had been stoned in the
area. When pupils saw the police coming, they quickly locked themselves in
classrooms. Police tried to kick down the doors but failed. They then broke
windows in upper classrooms and tossed tear-gas canisters inside. Terrified
children rushed out and were met with a hail of blows from police batons.
Shotgun blasts reverberated through the quadrangle and screaming pupils ran
in all directions. . . Two schoolboys [were] hit by birdshot. . . . Girls were
crying from the effects of tear-gas and some had fainted. Others were sobbing
hysterically while teachers tried to comfort them. One schoolboy was rugby
tackled by a policeman as he attempted to escape across the front lawn, and
then kicked. The pupils dispersed soon afterwards, but within minutes cars in
Thornton Road - which runs past the school - were [again] being stoned.43
Ten days later, Soweto students launched the third and most successful
Johannesburg stay-away, calling on workers to strike for three days in support of the
"student-worker alliance" for the "overthrowal of oppression" (Document 16). With
absentee rates running as high as 80 percent in Johannesburg industry and commerce,
Coloured and African workers in Cape Town joined in the work stoppage on September 15,
sustaining their protest through the following day and making the combined September
13-16 stay-away, as Brooks and Brickhill have judged it, the high-water mark of the
uprising and the most impressive political action ever to have been staged by black
workers in South Africa.44 Momentum was maintained the following week when Tembisa
workers stayed home for two days, bringing production in the industrial complex of
Isando northeast of Johannesburg to a halt. Two days later, inspired by the success of
their counterparts in Cape Town and referring to themselves as revolutionaries who
would rock the racist order (Document 17), Soweto students organised a brief but
dramatic "invasion" of the central city on the morning of Thursday, September 23.
Reponding to what the white press described as central Johannesburg's "first taste of
terror," camouflage-clad riot police arrested several hundred of the young invaders,
sealing off downtown streets to traffic in order to better pursue their quarry.45 A 16
year old Soweto student arrested in the "invasion," Dumisani Mbatha, died in police
custody two days later. At his funeral and those of several other student victims in
October, thousands of mourners congregated singing freedom songs, only to be met by
police determined to disperse what they saw as political demonstrations being held in
defiance of a ban on outdoor meetings. What would otherwise have been emotional but
nonviolent events turned into bloody confrontations as police fired on funeral crowds,
provoking new outbursts of rioting. By the last week of October, the toll of those killed in
the unrest since June 16 stood officially at 377.46
The Tide Ebbs
At the height of September's confrontations in Cape Town, police began
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not difficult for police to convince the hostel dwellers that young troublemakers needed to
be taught a lesson. Students had made no attempt to explain or justify the stay-aways or
the campaign against Bantu education to the largely migrant "bachelor" population of the
Soweto hostels, nor had any apologies been made to them for the destruction of the
municipal beerhalls which were a center of their social life. Even in the best of times,
there were class tensions between the settled urban residents of South African townships
and the less sophisticated semi-urbanised contract workers who made up the majority of
inmates in the dreary barrack-like hostels of the Witwatersrand and Cape Town. Once
confrontations had occurred between student strike enforcers and unsympathetic hostel-
dwellers trying to go to work during the first stay-away, the events of August 24 were
simply a case of tinder waiting for a spark.
The student leadership, braced for transition after a secret dash over the
Botswana border by Mashinini on August 23, now also faced the urgent need to improve
communications with Soweto's adult population. By shifting its venue from school to
school, the SSRC was managing to convene a quorum approximately once a week and thus
to keep its lines of contact open to students, and through them, by verbal means, to
parents.37 After the hostel clashes, however, leaflet communication assumed both a new
importance and tone. The sometimes didactic language of earlier SSRC strike flyers (for
example, Document 14) shifted to a more straightforward appeal for unity and
cooperation from all workers, including hostel dwellers (Document 15). Through
older allies in SASO and the BPC, indirect contact was made with representatives of
Inkatha who at that stage also opposed the manipulation of Zulu migrants by the police.38
Meetings in several Soweto hostels were convened, and the reasoning behind work
stoppages explained. By September 13-15 when the SSRC staged a third well supported
three day stay-away, most hostel dwellers joined in the strike, even taking it upon
themselves in some cases to beat up their fellow hostel-dwellers who declined to
participate.
Just when black students in Johannesburg began successfully drawing older
generations into the uprising, unrest was also spreading spontaneously to new regions of
the country. Diffused more by media coverage and word of mouth than by any coordinated
effort on the part of students, news of the events of mid-June in Soweto had touched off
sporadic demonstrations and arson attacks on schools and government buildings in
townships scattered across all four provinces.39 The country remained largely calm
through July, but by early August when schools reopened after the winter break, many
students had resolved to add their voices to the Johannesburg protests, generally
imitating the tactics of placard marches, targetted vandalism, and school boycotts to
express rejection of Bantu education. Secondary school students formed local SRCs to lead
the protests. On August 2, students at the University of the Western Cape launched a class
boycott campaign which threw the campus into turmoil for several months and helped to
ignite a spirit of revolt in Coloured secondary schools throughout the Cape peninsula.40
African secondary students, who were far fewer than Coloureds in the Cape Town area,
also began mobilizing, and on August 11 they staged marches in the townships of Langa,
Nyanga and Gugulethu, the last of which ended in disorder and a police assault in which 16
demonstrators died. By late August, arson attacks, the stoning of buildings and vehicles,
school disruptions and police shootings were occurring on an almost daily basis in both
African and Coloured townships around Cape Town, as well as in towns scattered through
the eastern and northern Cape, Transkei, the Orange Free State, and Transvaal. The only
major region that remained relatively unaffected was Natal, where those protests and
incidents that did occur were not met with the violent police responses which were the
principal cause of bloodshed and escalating confrontation elsewhere.41 In rural areas
countrywide, police reported a rising incidence of unexplained fires on white farms and
at sawmills, while a mysterious veld fire in mid-September touched off an explosion at a
dynamite factory in Modderfontein.42
Once militant protests gathered momentum in the western Cape in early August,
schooling was disrupted and dozens of confrontations occured between students and police.
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experimenting with a strategy of mass arrests to break the momentum of the uprising.
On a single day, September 10, police detained almost 200 people in the simmering
African and Coloured townships of the eastern Cape, and four days later, a house-to-house
sweep in Alexandra township in northern Johannesburg netted more than 800 alleged
"agitators" and helped to break Alexandra's support for the stay-away of September 13-
15. By October similar methods were being applied in Soweto as police sought to
intimidate members of the SSRC and capture its leadership core. In a raid on Morris
Isaacson High School the morning of October 22, police detained all the teachers and
students present - a mere 78 people under the irregular conditions then prevailing in
Soweto's schools -- purportedly as suspects in connection with petrol bomb attacks on
the houses of black policemen. The number of trials of students on charges of public
violence rose steadily, while others who were suspected of being ringleaders or of having
connections to political organizations were detained for interrogation under provisions of
the newly enacted Internal Security Act. As the repression intensified, what in the early
stages of the uprising had been a mere trickle of young people fleeing to sanctuary in
neighboring countries by November had become a flood.
In Soweto, where Khotso Seatlholo, an 18 year old final year student at Naledi
High School, had replaced Mashinini as head of the SSRC, October was a month of shifting
tactics as three new national campaigns were promoted to mark a period of mourning for
the dead. The squandering of money on liquor was the first new target; consumer spending
during the Christmas holidays was the second. Shebeens-illegal township bars-were
ordered to close or face student wrath, and adults were asked to forego holiday festivities
and gift-giving as a sign of solidarity with those who had suffered death, detention, or
victimization during the year (Document 18). Soweto shebeen proprietors tried
bargaining with the SSRC for a compromise, but most fell into line. One establishment
that refused to shut down was partially destroyed in a dynamite blast in late November.
Cape Town shebeens proved less cooperative, and dozens were wrecked in early October
by squads of youthful enforcers who smashed their merchandise in the streets. An SSRC
call for a November 1-5 stay-away in Johannesburg (Document 19) was largely
ignored by workers, but as Christmas approached the consumer boycott was widely
observed, and even the National Professional Soccer League agreed to limit its schedule of
games as a gesture of mourning. In Cape Town, student determination to destroy beerhalls
and shebeens had angered African migrant workers in the townships' huge single-sex
hostel complexes, and in the holiday season, tensions rose and eventually boiled over as
migrants, abetted by the police, attacked residents and their houses, leaving 26 dead over
Christmas weekend. In a statement that was quickly banned, the Ministers' Fraternal of
Langa, Gugulethu and Nyanga enumerated the injustices which had led to the
confrontations in Cape Town, and invoked the subversive biblical injunction for
Christians to "obey God rather than men" (Document 20).47
The third national campaign initiated by the SSRC was a boycott of all end-of-year
exams as a gesture of mourning and a symbol of the rejection of Bantu education (see
Documents 16 and 17). Student opinion was far from unanimously in favor of a boycott,
and in many parts of the country exams proceeded on schedule, despite scattered
disruptions as some students used intimidation tactics to force others to comply with the
protest. But in the core regions of organized student militance - the Reef, Pretoria,
Cape Town and the eastern Cape - the boycott was widely observed, leaving the heavily
overburdened African school system with the prospect of record numbers of students
having to repeat a year in 1977. When school officials proposed that those who had
boycotted in November 1976 be allowed to sit make-up exams in February and March
1977, the SSRC was caught in the dilemma embodied in so many aspects of African life:
to accept the hated "half loaf dispensed by the apartheid system, or proudly starve. For
each individual, the choice lay between sacrificing personal ambitions and disappointing
the expectations of parents on the one hand, or living with the guilt of being declared a
sell-out by one's peers on the other. After a confusing period of sending out conflicting
signals, the SSRC left the decision to individuals, and retreated to a low-profile position
for the early months of the new year. In January, Seatlholo fled to Botswana after being
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wounded by police gunfire in a car chase, and was succeeded as SSRC chairman by Daniel
Montsitsi, who had been a final year student at Sekano Ntoane High School.
The sense of defeat and division surrounding the exams boycott marked the low
point of student prestige in a year which had otherwise witnessed an extraordinary
inversion of past patterns of black leadership as parents deferred to their children for
political guidance and motivation. Combined with the poor popular response to the
November 1-5 stay-away, the exam debacle suggested a clear need for student leaders to
revise their tactics and search for more achievable goals lest the momentum of the revolt
continue to ebb. Student spirits were still high, and as a collective force, students
remained potentially mobilizable countrywide since most had returned to school by early
1977 despite the lack of any substantive Improvements. The government changed the
name of the Bantu Education Department to the Department of Education and Training in
1977, and announced that textbooks would become free by 1979. In most immediate
respects, however, school conditions had become worse because of the resignation of many
teachers, the high number of students repeating, and the widespread damage to school
buildings. In Soweto and to varying degrees in other townships where SRCs had formed
during 1976, student organization remained intact despite the removal or flight of many
individual student leaders. In Soweto, a rudimentary structure of SSRC subcommittees
functioned to deal with transport, "conscientising," the production of leaflets, and the
forging of links with other regions. Dreams of quick revolutionary solutions had faded
and been replaced with a working list of "major priorities" that included the scrapping of
Bantu education, the release of students still in detention, the abolition of all government
controlled "puppet bodies" such as Urban Bantu Councils and ethnic school boards, and the
initiation of a national convention to negotiate South Africa's future.48 This last aim,
poignantly discussed in Document 21, was regularly dismissed with contempt by the
Vorster government, but had been proposed over many years by liberals as a solution for
the country's problems .
Where collaborators were concerned, the SSRC had fought a long, low-intensity
campaign of insult and criticism aimed at the ineffectual Soweto Urban Bantu Council, a
body already held in low esteem by the public at the time the uprising began (See Chapter
8). Rioters had targetted the pretentious UBC office building from the first day of the
revolt, and by September a number of UBC members were threatening to resign out of
frustration at the council's unpopularity, which they attributed to the fact that its
powers were purely advisory, and its advice was usually ignored.49 The SSRC took the
view that the entire UBC should resign and be replaced by a legitimate representative
body - one more like the BPA -- chosen by Soweto residents. Disregarding the debates
between the UBC and its critics, the West Rand Administration Board decided in April
1977 that from May 1, Soweto rents would go up, and that the rises would be unusually
large due to WRAB's loss of revenues from the burnt-out municipal beerhalls. The
decision came as a gift to the SSRC, which was looking for a way to breathe life into its
campaign against collaborators. It soon became evident that the UBC members had known
of the coming rent hikes and had done nothing to inform residents or mobilize them to
fight the increases; the UBC could thus be blamed for the hikes, and given an ultimatum to
resign (Document 22). On April 27, what started as a peaceful and police-sanctioned
march through Soweto by several thousand students protesting the rent increases, turned
into a melee when marchers began stoning the UBC headquarters. The Administration
Board nervously suspended the increases, and the SSRC scored a victory which restored
its earlier prestige. Further demonstrating its power to muscle opponents aside, the
SSRC through a combination of public shaming and anonymous threats, succeeded by the
first week of June 1977 in forcing all leading members of the UBC to resign, leaving the
government no choice but to officially suspend the already defunct body. Soweto's 26
ethnic school boards were targetted next, and plans laid for a campaign to force the
resignation of black policemen.
But the flame of the revolt was sputtering out. The possibilities for mass action
by unarmed crowds had become constrained by a combination of police controls and a
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growing realism among students about the costs and benefits of such tactics. As the
emotional first anniversary of June 16 approached, police swoops netted Montsitsi and
several dozen other Soweto student activists. Plans for the commemoration proceeded
nationwide, and despite a spate of violent incidents, including two days of police-student
confrontation in Uitenhage in the eastern Cape which left ten dead, most black
communities held relatively peaceful memorial services, supported by a partial closure
of schools, shops and offices. ANC underground pamphleteers exploded a pamphlet bomb
in downtown Johannesburg on the evening of June 15. Eight days later, the SSRC, now
under the leadership of Trofomo Sono_an eleventh grader at Madibane High School, staged
a second successful "invasion" of central Johannesburg, massing about 500 protesters at
John Vorster Square security police headquarters to demand the release of student
detainees. Police baton-charged the demonstrators and arrested 146; one youth was shot
dead in simultaneous demonstrations in Soweto. On the same day, June 23, parliament
put old wine in new bottles by approving legislation to replace Urban Bantu Councils with
new-look Community Councils. The demise of the Soweto UBC -- the uprising's last
major shock to the apartheid system -- had left the government undeterred in its resolve
to operate through bureaucracies of black collaborators; there was simply no other
practical method to administer the country's huge rightless majority. But the prospect
that blacks would eventually come to accept this "indirect rule" arrangement was as dead
as the uprising's martyred children.
Protest or Challenge?
It is not inconceivable that the uprising might have caused the entire ediface of
apartheid to crumble had the white government been more deeply divided about what to do
in the face of its deteriorating legitimacy, and had blacks been better organized to sustain
pressure on the system. In the event, the balance of forces, though inching towards
parity, still firmly favored the white state, buttressed as it was by a loyal and well
financed military and police establishment, a supportive electorate and business class,
and a bloc of international trading partners less concerned about South Africa's domestic
politics than about its significance as a minor outpost in the Cold War.
Nevertheless, the uprising created the most acute political crisis faced by the
government since the 1960 Sharpeville emergency. Realizing that the revolt posed no
short run threat to its control of the state, the National Party adopted a hardline stance
from the outset, never publicly conceding that the crisis might require any
reconsideration of the fundamentals of its policy. There was in fact "no crisis" at all,
Vorster declared in a widely quoted speech at Springs in late August 1976. Although
occasional adjustments might be needed in the implementation of particular policies, he
said, no South African should have any doubt about the moral or practical soundness of the
course the government was pursuing. According to National Party cabinet ministers,
members of parliament, and sundry pro-government experts who came forward to offer
explanations to the Cillie Commission and elsewhere, the township disturbances were not
the result of government policies, but were caused by agitators, tsotsis, unpatriotic
elements in the English press who sought to incite discontent, and "confusion" regarding
the school language issue caused by "poor communication." One Nationalist MP accused
the parliamentary opposition of complicity in the revolt on the grounds that they claimed
to have known that an explosion was imminent but did not make their information
available. Vorster in a parliamentary address hinted darkly about a conspiracy of
"certain organizations and persons, working together to achieve . . . obvious
objectives."50
Behind the rhetorical facade of righteousness and unanimity, however, the
uprising dramatically sharpened the festering conflicts within the National Party
regarding the direction of "separate development." The party's rightwing favored making
no concessions to liberal or foreign opinion, regardless of the country's growing isolation
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from international trade, investment, and sport. Party realists, backed to varying
degrees by the Afrikaner establishment in big business, the media, academia and the
Broederbond, recognized that if the country's isolation were to persist and worsen, the
economy would eventually collapse from the combined forces of population growth,
unemployment, and a failure to attract new capital and technology. To prevent the further
erosion of the country's international position, particularly after the calamitous
publicity generated by the uprising, it was obvious to the realists that major repairs to
South Africa's battered image would be necessary. Inevitably, reforms in the apartheid
system would be required to achieve this as well as to cool black discontent. Coloured
solidarity with Africans, however fleeting in its manifestations during the uprising, was
worrisome and clearly required tactical concessions that would reinforce fragmentation
along racial lines. The problem for the National Party was how to garb reforms and
concessions so that the conservative all-white electorate would see them as cost-free,
verkrampte leaders in the party would accept them as consistent with past policy, and
enough blacks would be seduced by them to enable South Africa to project a new
international image of itself as ruled by a legitimate government standing for democratic
principles and opportunity for all.
This was an impossible mission, but it was to take another decade of decline and
another uprising - broader, more sustained, and more economically catastrophic - for
its futility finally to be impressed on the inner core of the National Party leadership. In
the meantime, despite the shedding of its rightwing which broke away to form the
Conservative Party in 1982, the party continued to cohere around the fundamentals of
"grand apartheid" first conceived by Verwoerd: the creation of "independent" black ethnic
mini-states, the eventual designation of all Africans as "foreign," the continued
relegation of Coloureds and Indians to subordinate political status (despite their
incorporation in 1984 into a tricameral parliament under a new constitution), and most
importantly, the granite determination never to accede to the principle of one-person-
one-vote in a unified South Africa. The uprising of 1976-1977 made no appreciable
dent in the regime's pursuit of this basic blueprint. Instead, its response to the revolt
was to intensify the search for new divide-and-rule tactics at home, and new maneuvers
to improve its image abroad. The revolt, as Kane-Berman observed at the time, was a
turning point at which no turn was made--at least not by the government.51
It was among blacks that the revolt decisively altered both the pace and the
direction of change in South Africa. In the decade preceding the uprising, Africans had
registered enormous gains in potential power. Their economic leverage as consumers and
skilled workers had grown tremendously, although it remained unrealised because of a
lack of organization and the unrecognized status of African trade unions. In terms of
international public opinion, the National Party government had already lost the moral
high ground to the worldwide anti-apartheid movement, to the point where all that stood
between Pretoria and the onset of a serious drive for economic sanctions in the West was
a delicately nurtured public relations campaign, aimed at conservative opinion and
designed to project an image of South Africa as a stable society earnestly seeking just
solutions to its difficult problems. Politically, as we have seen, thousands of members of
the youth and student generation had already been touched to one degree or another by the
psychological and semantic transformations introduced by black consciousness. Among
them was a small but very militant element who had distanced themselves totally from
the fear and defeatism afflicting the adult generation, and were primed for action.
Though weak when measured against the task of ousting the National Party government,
these youthful activists had acquired a level of self-confidence and organizational and
leadership skill that put them a quantum leap beyond their parents' generation. Their
ability to disseminate propaganda and to repeatedly bring large crowds of demonstrators
into the streets was impressive; so was their physical courage in the face of brutal police
methods. Yet their inexperience, and the superficiality of their knowledge about mass
struggles of the past, meant that their ability to strategize was underdeveloped. They
were a daring cadre of lieutenants without senior officers, a Red Guard without a Mao
Zedong. Their energies could not be poured into any existing legal organizations where a
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more seasoned and strategically sophisticated leadership was already in place, because by
1976 the government's campaign of repression had insured that no such organizations
were free to operate. For these young militants and the thousands of their peers who
became highly politicized during the events of 1976-77, the uprising itself became a
crash course in political reality, a harsh lesson in confrontation which, while failing to
topple South Africa's rulers, vitally strengthened the forces challenging the established
order.
Had the exiled liberation movements been far more advanced in the development of
underground networks and military capabilities before 1976, they might have been able
to ride the wave of student anger to create a level of chaos and bloodshed sufficient to
prompt either foreign intervention or a move by whites toward negotiation. But their
operations inside South Africa were still in an embryonic stage when the violence of June
16 erupted. A handful of white members were producing the ANC leaflets that began
appearing in 1970. A small number of older activists who had been released from
Robben Island in the early 1970s were starting to organize underground ANC and PAC
units. Both of the older movements tried to insert members from their own fledgling
undergrounds into the black consciousness movement, and to recruit people who were
already active in its constituent organizations (see Chapter 2 ) . 5 2 By 1975, the
leadership of NAYO and SASO had become ANC-oriented, while PAC had made inroads into
the BPCi The steady exodus continued of young people crossing into the neighboring states
with the goal of joining the movements outside (see Document 6), but the number of new
recruits involved in underground activities within South Africa was small, probably
numbering no more than 200 countrywide.53 By June 1976, guerrilla attacks had not
yet begun, nor had caches of weapons been accumulated.
The outbreak of violence in Soweto took the leaders of the underground liberation
movements by surprise. Despite the restrictions under which they lived and their need
to exercise extreme caution, the leaders of the ANC in Johannesburg-Joe Gqabi, Martin
Ramokgadi, and Elliot Shabangu-were able to establish contact with members of the
Soweto student leadership fairly early in the uprising. Shabangu's nephew, Super Moloi,
was one of a number of highly politicized students close to the nerve center of the SSRC.
Once contact had been made, however, the material resources which the underground ANC
could offer to the SSRC's would-be revolutionaries were disappointingly meager. The
students were developing their own contacts for the printing and distribution of leaflets,
the borrowing of automobiles, and the collection of funds; the Black Parents Association
and later the South African Council of Churches were taking charge of welfare functions
for families affected by the violence. The ANC had little to contribute beyond a measure of
logistical support for students wishing to leave the country. On a non-material level, it is
difficult to determine the extent to which the SSRC leadership may have been influenced
in its tactics, targets, or ideas by discussions with ANC veterans. The language of SSRC
leaflets strongly reflects black consciousness influence and no obvious effort to project
the ANC's particular type of nonracial nationalism. Montsitsi in later years recalled
being urged to target the UBC by Gqabi, Shabangu, and Winnie Mandela (who had been
unbanned in 1975 and had established herself as a supporter of student activists, and of
black consciousness, even before becoming a leader of the Black Parents Association in
the week after June 16). It was unlikely that students needed urging in this direction,
however, because they had already spontaneously demonstrated their rage against state-
sponsored institutions from the first day of the June rioting. Perhaps more significant
was Montsitsi's recollection that ANC veterans advised that once UBC members agreed to
resign, the SSRC should be conciliatory toward them, rather than adopting a vindictive
attitude.54 Such tactical moves added to the SSRC's reputation for maturity and
moderation.
There is no evidence, however, that the opinions of the ANC extorted any more
influence on the SSRC leadership than the advice and assistance offered by other allies,
including Drake Koka of BAWL) (who assisted in producing the SSRC's stay-away leaflets)
and Beyers Naude, Cedric Mayson and other whites in the Christian Institute and the South
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African Council of Churches (who assisted the SSRC financially). So large was the mass
of Soweto's student population, and so coherent and effective its leadership by comparison
with other organized black groups, it was only a matter of time before popular adulation
led to the SSRC being spoken of as Soweto's "shadow government" -- a self-image its
leaders were not inclined to trade in for the status of junior partner in an alliance with
any other group, particularly one whose capability to take on the enemy had turned out to
be considerably less impressive than students had initially hoped or imagined. Witnesses
testified at the trial of Gqabi and Ramokgadi in 1977 that at a December 1976 meeting
between Khotso Seatlholo and Naledi Tsiki, a member of the ANC who had been trained as a
guerrilla in the Soviet Union, Tsiki invited the SSRC to form a working relationship with
the ANC, but that Seatlholo refused on the grounds that the SSRC wanted to retain its
autonomy.55 It was agreed, however, that SSRC members were free to join the ANC as
individuals, which indeed some by that time had already done. For several months before
his arrest on December 31, 1976, Gqabi conducted classes in Marxist-Leninist
philosophy for an intellectual sub-group within the SSRC, some of whom were recruited
to the SACP as well as to the ANC. A second SSRC grouping -- the so-called "suicide squad"
-- which initially specialized in petrol bomb attacks, late in 1976 converted itself into
an ANC unit, carried out a number of acts of sabotage including the bombing of the defiant
Soweto shebeen mentioned earlier, and was becoming involved in the recruitment of
fighters to leave the country when its members were arrested on the same night as
Gqabi.56
Post mortem analyses of the uprising, particularly from critics on the left,
faulted the Soweto student leaders, and by implication other urban SRCs, for their
inability to liaise collectively with black workers in any way other than through
pamphleteering. Even in their stay-away leaflets, critics noted, students made little
reference to concerns specifically affecting workers. If ANC or Communist Party
veterans advised students to make contact with working class leaders or place a more
pointed emphasis on worker grievances, it appears to have made little or no impact on the
SSRC's strategists. Reflecting on the uprising in later years, Morobe agreed that students
had no notion of how to organize workers, but he also pointed out that given the
conservatism of the Trade Union Council of South Africa to which almost all existing black
unions were then affiliated, black workers themselves had no identifiable vanguard of
politically progressive leaders with whom students could have established a working
relationship.57 It could perhaps be argued that the students' use of the stay-away as a
tactic in 1976 was deficient because, unlike general strikes of indefinite duration, the
stay-away serves a revolutionary purpose only if it is used as a device for the long term
building of worker organization and worker consciousness - purposes not encompassed
in the SSRC's thinking.58 In the end, however, the political consciousness of black
workers, like that of all blacks, sharpened significantly as a result of the drama and the
traumas of the uprising, such that in its aftermath the pace of organization among
workers accelerated rapidly (see Chapter 7).
Just as it is ahistorical to argue that students missed an available opportunity to
forge a worker-student alliance in 1976, it is also inaccurate to characterize the
uprising as merely focussed around grievances relating to education, important as these
were in initiating and fuelling the rebellion.59 Attacks, both planned and spontaneous,
against government facilities and collaborators, demonstrations against the September
1976 visit of American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and the political language of
most student leaflets and statements, all indicate that student leaders saw their activities
as political and as directed toward fundamental and not merely reformist changes in the
apartheid system, and that they hoped to direct the sometimes unfocussed anger of their
peers at political targets. The tactics they chose tended to be limited in imagination, and
did not reflect any sophisticated revolutionary drive to build alternative institutions,
create "liberated zones," or subvert the security forces - objectives which in any case
would have required far more time and greater capability than students could muster
acting alone in 1976. Nevertheless, there was a clear insurrectionary spirit to the
revolt as it unfolded following the unplanned rioting of June, and this spirit fanned
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diffuse hopes and expectations of greater revolutionary action to come, attitudes which
contributed to intense racial polarization in the aftermath of the uprising.60
In the short run, it was evident by mid-1977 that the government had come out
on top in the township confrontations. The school system did not appreciably improve,
and amelioration of township conditions occurred very slowly where it occurred at al l .61
Urban Bantu Councils were scrapped but replaced with similar bodies called Community
Councils. Rent hikes were postponed in Soweto but eventually imposed. The term
"separate development" was replaced in official discourse by "plural development" and
the Department of Bantu Affairs changed its name to the Department of Plural Relations, a
ploy long familiar to Africans (Document 23). Despite the obvious discomfort which
the revolt had inspired in high places, day to day existence in the townships, with all its
deprivations, controls and indignities, continued much as before.
At the subjective level, however, the uprising brought momentous developments
in popular awareness. It created heroes, martyrs, and -- most significantly - prison
graduates for a new generation, and with them a new political consciousness and
sophistication. Students in every major urban area and even in remote communities, and
parents through their children, were affected by the revolt and drawn to reflect on the
reasons for its ups and downs, the tactics of its leaders, and the responses of the
authorities and of whites generally to the challenges it posed. Why did so many die? Why
did the uprising fail to change the government's approach? What could have made it
succeed? Could South Africa achieve change only through war like Mozambique, Angola,
and Rhodesia, or could the system be brought down through unarmed action like the
uprising but on a larger scale? For many activists the obvious solution was to take up
arms; others put priority on political organization. Some in the former group held to a
belief in quick and apocalyptic scenarios of revolution, but many who had become
seasoned in the events of 1976-77 recognized the possibility that their political
commitment might have to carry them through a long and taxing war of attrition fought on
multiple fronts.
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approximately once a week and sometimes twice a week if a demonstration was to be planned."
Judgment of J. Van Dyk in S v Twala, p. 95
3 8
 Conversation with Jackie Selebi (March 1989), who noted that serious debates preceded these
efforts to work with people who were regarded as part of the "system." Buthelezi addressed a
mass meeting of Soweto hostel dwellers on August 28 during which he accused police of inciting the
attacks. See Rand Daily Mail August 29, 1976.
3 9
 Pro-government witnesses who testified to the Cillie Commission made statements suggesting
that the revolt spread through the activities of agitators. These witnesses were not subjected to
cross-examination, yet their remarks were quoted in the press as evidence. One spoke of 51
Soweto students who travelled to Natal by train to spread the uprising, another of four ringleaders
at UWC who travelled to Port Elizabeth with similar intent. Percy Yutar, a prominent National
Party supporter, who led the questioning before the commission, made statements to the press
during the inquiry stating that "27 men in three cars" had instigated violence throughout the
Transvaal {Rand Daily Mail, December 4, 1976, January 18 and 25, 1977). Some mild credence is
leant to the agitator thesis in a report by anthropologist Harriet Sibisi who visited Natal at the
height of the uprising and noted that it was significant that "the Natal schools where there were
disturbances were all boarding schools with substantial numbers of Soweto children. At other
township schools in Natal and at country schools which take no boarders there were no
disturbances" ("Report by Dr. Harriet Sibisi on a Visit to South Africa, July 20-August 11 ,
1976*).
4 0
 An extended discussion of this period at UWC appears in an interview by George Fredrickson with
Yvonne Muthien ( May 1980 )
4 1
 Other factors contributing to the lower level of political activity in Natal may have included the
absence in Natal of the compulsory Afrikaans ruling, the lesser impact of the homeland citizenship
rules in a province where homeland areas were in much closer proximity to jobs in the large towns
and cities, the slight improvement in wages following the 1973 Durban strikes, and the prominence
of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, who left no vacuum of adult leadership into which students could move.
The role of Inkatha leaders in discouraging student militance is discussed in testimony before the
Cillie Commission by Leon Mellet, then a crime reporter for the Natal Mercury, and later revealed
to be an undercover policeman (Cillie Commission testimony, pp. 4199-4207). Hirson's view put
forward in Year of Fire that the 1976 uprising was principally inspired by the labor militance of
1973 in Natal, seems implausible in light of the relative quiescence of Natal during the student
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uprising.
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 The Sunday Times of September 25, 1976, reported that the Minister of Agriculture and a son-
in-law of Prime Minister Vorster were among the farmers who had suffered extensive losses from
fires.
4 3
 Rand Daily Mail, September 4, 1976
4 4
 Brooks and Brickhill, Whirlwind, p. 32
4 5
 Starkly contrasting impressions of the student marchers of September 23 were presented by the
liberal Rand Daily Mali on September 24, which painted them as a mob of violent thugs using terror
tactics, and by George Bizos, one of the lawyers who represented the 159 eventually charged with
public violence, who described them as disciplined, mature and exemplary young people
(Conversation with Bizos, October 1989).
4 6
 New York Times, October 24, 1976. Kane-Berman describes the October funeral incidents and
other unprovoked cases of police violence, pp. 32-36.
4 7
 Later in January 1977 the Ministers' Fraternal issued a second document, an indictment of the
police, "The Role of Riot Police in the Burnings and Killings, Nyanga, Cape Town, Christmas
1976."* This statement was also banned, but not before Rev. David Russell had circulated it to
members of parliament. According to the Sunday Times of January 2, 1977, a third of the
combined population of Gugulethu, Langa and Nyanga of 100,000 people was migrant workers, the
highest proportion being in Langa "where 24,000 of the 31,500 inhabitants are men living without
their wives and families in single quarters." Also see the testimony of Oscar Mpetha to the Cillie
Commission, pp. 8259 ff
4 8
 These are set forth in an undated SSRC document, "Major Priorities (and Other Projects)"*,
drafted by Wilson Twala for chairman Daniel Montsitsi in early 1977. The subcommittees of the
SSRC are listed in an undated SSRC document headed "Departments"*. Both documents were among
the documentary exhibits presented in S v Twala and others (the "Kempton Park trial," 1978-79),
the trial of the student leaders of the uprising.
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 Rand Daily Mail , September 4, 1976. It is interesting to note in light of the hostile relationship
between the SSRC and the UBC that Tsietsi Mashinini was the nephew of David Thebehali, a
prominent UBC member.
5 0
 Hansard, June 18, 1976, quoted by Brooks and Brickhill, p. 27. The MP who blamed the
Progressive Federal Party (H. J . van der Walt of Schweizer-Reinecke) was quoted in the Sunday
Tribune, June 27, 1976. The English press was blamed by, inter alia, I. W. Ackermann, director of
the Highveld Bantu Administration Board, in testimony to the Cillie Commission reported by the
Rand Daily Mail, October 27, 1976. M. C Botha, the minister of Bantu Education, attributed the
blow-up over Afrikaans to "confusion," presumably on the part of Africans.
5 1
 Kane-Berman, Soweto , p. 232. Kane-Berman is particularly critical of big business for
exerting no pressure on the government to make a fundamental change of course (pp. 155 ff). It
should also be noted that the eruption of June 16 caught the Vorster government at a moment of
intense preoccupation with the crisis in Rhodesia, where a simmering guerrilla war was heating up
in the aftermath of Portugal's collapse in neighboring Mozambique. Fearful that the Soviet Union
would take advantage of the fighting in Angola, Rhodesia and Namibia to extend its influence in the
region, the United States was seeking Vorster's cooperation in ending the Rhodesian war and
replacing the regime of Ian Smith with a moderate majority-rule government. Vorster was caught
in a political riptide in the region as well as at home; from his perspective, all the options on
Rhodesia were bad, but he decided to cooperate with American aims, perhaps in return for
assurances that the United States would take no steps that might worsen South Africa's economic
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recession.
5 2
 Information on the ANC underground in this period is drawn in part from conversations with
Harry Gwala (December 1989), Sibusiso Ndebele (December 1989), Nkosazana Zuma (June 1989),
Murphy Morobe (May 1991), Khehla Shubane (November 1990), Daniel Montsitsi (July 1989) and
the interviews of Victoria Butler with Billy Masetlha (February 1988), Bheki Langa (February
1988) and Indres Naidoo (February 1988). Among those who joined the ANC before the uprising
were Dtltza Mji, Nkosazana Dlamini [Zuma] , Sibusiso Ndebele, Mosima "Tokyo" Sexwale, Naledi
Tsiki, Paul Dikeledi, Khehla Shubane, Amos Masondo, Joseph Molokeng, Tebello Motapanyane, Elias
"Roller" Masinga, and Billy Masetlha.
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 Howard Barrell, MK: the ANC's Armed Struggle (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 32
5 4
 Conversation with Daniel Montsitsi, (July 1989). Montsitsi also recalled being taught freedom
songs from the 1950s by ANC veterans. Hirson states that "it was during the height of the Revolt
that the clandestine ANC . . . was able to join the students in organising some of the most important
activities of the Revolt, ' but he offers no substantiation for this except that one ANC leaflet
supported the SSRC's August 23-25 stay-away call.
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 Rand Daily Mail, July 16, 1977, and court record of S v Sexwale (trial of "the Pretoria 12").
According to Morobe, the SSRC, or at least its inner core, had debated at great length about
whether or not to affiliate to the ANC or PAC, and had decided against it (Workshop presentation,
Albert Einstein Institution, 2May 4, 1991). For Tsietsi Mashinini's criticisms of the ANC from
exile, see Chapter 2 . Although Mashinini's most quoted remarks
occurred in January 1977, it is possible that Seatlholo in December 1976 knew of his
predecessor's attack on the ANC and PAC made in the British journal Red Weekly in mid-October,
in which he said that the older liberation movements were "extinct internally" and 'as far as the
struggle is concerned . . . not doing anything." Quoted in Alex Calllnlcos and John Rogers, Southern
Africa After Soweto , (London: Pluto Press, 1978), p. 162-3.
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 Paul Langa, the senior member of the "suicide squad," was arrested in January 1977, tried for
the attacks, and sentenced to 25 years in prison. The other members of the unit, all of whom were
in the inner core of the SSRC leadership although they did not hold official positions, included
Mafison "Murphy" Morobe, Super Moloi, Titi Mthenjane (??), Elias "Roller" Masinga, and Billy
Masetlha. Interview of Victoria Butler with Billy Masetlha (Feb 1988).
5 7
 Conversation with Morobe (May 1991)
5 6
 Glenn Moss has borrowed this argument from Rosa Luxemburg and developed it in a master's
dissertation, Crisis and Conflict: Soweto 1976-1977 , Department of History, University of the
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1982. Curiously, he does not address the problems created by the
state of African trade unionism in 1976-77.
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 A June 16 anniversary feature in the Star, June 15, 1993, for example, reasserts a common
but erroneous view that "the demands of the 'class of 1976' were largely confined to educational
matters, mainly the scrapping of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction and free and compulsory
education. But this approach changed significantly in the years following 1976, largely because
students realised that they had the capacity to force the Government to make social and political
changes."
6 0
 Attitude studies based on survey data in the post-1976 period are discussed in Lawrence
Schlemmer, "Build-up to Revolution or Impasse?," in Heribert Adam, ed., South Africa: the Limits
of Reform Politics, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983), 60-82.
6 1
 Big business took the view that Africans would be less susceptible to politicization if their
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material standards of living were rising and if those with middle class aspirations were abled to
satisfy their ambitions in some measure. The Urban Foundation, which was sponsored by business
and embraced a philosophy of amelioration, was established in the aftermath of the uprising. After
1976 the National Party also grudgingly came to accept this philosophy, once identified with the
"English'1-oriented parliamentary opposition (the United Party and later the Progressive Party).
The government-appointed Riekert Commission, established in 1977 to review government options
regarding the future of urban African, proposed in its 1979 report that Africans with permanent
('Section 10") urban status be accorded an increasingly more privileged position than homeland
Africans, presumably with a view to fostering the assumed conservative tendencies of the former.
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